The Lebanese Armed Forces face alarming trends of Shi’ite influence and cooperation with Hezbollah, raising doubts about their ability to enforce ceasefire agreements. President Joseph Aoun claims the state will take charge of security, yet evidence challenges this assertion. A demographic shift in recruitment affects the LAF’s independence, with fears that it may become a proxy for Hezbollah, entrenching issues compounded by past military aid leaks.
A recent report from the Alma Research and Education Center details concerning trends within the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) stationed in southern Lebanon. It raises issues regarding the rising influence of Shi’ite elements within the LAF and their collaboration with Hezbollah, calling into question the LAF’s capability to uphold the ceasefire agreement with Israel.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun is actively seeking to persuade the international community that security in Lebanon is solely the state’s responsibility. Yet, evidence highlights the LAF’s compromised position, which dampens Aoun’s assertions. In an interview, Aoun stated, “Only the state will be responsible for security,” emphasizing a desire for national security to be centralized within the government.
Despite Aoun’s declarations, he is currently visiting Saudi Arabia, aiming to renew the previous $3 billion annual aid package for the LAF that was halted in 2016 due to Lebanon’s failure to condemn attacks on Saudi diplomatic offices in Iran. Aoun seeks to position himself, alongside the new Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, as a counterbalance to Hezbollah. However, this optimism clashes with the grim reality articulated by Tal Beeri, head of research at the Alma Center, who remarked, “Aoun says what the Americans want him to say,” reflecting skepticism about the actual effectiveness of the LAF.
The report sheds light on the alarming Shi’itization within the LAF amid demographic shifts and the cessation of mandatory conscription. There is a distinct decrease in Christian enlistment while Shiite recruitment rises. This shift may soon yield a Shiite majority within the LAF, raising concerns about its ability to function independently of Hezbollah’s influence, especially in enforcing international resolutions like U.N. Resolution 1701.
The LAF’s failure to prevent incursions into Israeli-prepared areas exemplifies its growing ambivalence, attributable to Shiite commanders’ reluctance to oppose Hezbollah. The proximity of familial ties between Hezbollah operatives and LAF personnel increases risks that the LAF could be utilized as a tool for Hezbollah or unintentionally assist its operations.
Moreover, the report notes past instances where U.S. aid, including anti-tank missiles and reconnaissance equipment, has fallen into Hezbollah’s hands. Approximately 85% of the LAF’s equipment is American-made, underscoring the potential national security risk posed by perceived cooperation between the LAF and Hezbollah.
A recommendation emerges for Lebanon to adopt strategies aimed at isolating Hezbollah domestically, curtailing Iranian support, and ensuring non-Shiite communities are retained. Beeri emphasizes the need to reassess the placement of Shi’ite officers, particularly in southern Lebanon, to reinforce LAF independence and effectiveness in peacekeeping endeavors.
In conclusion, the Lebanese Armed Forces are experiencing significant internal challenges that undermine their capacity to act independently of Hezbollah’s influence. A considerable demographic shift towards Shi’ite recruitment raises serious concerns about the LAF’s role within Lebanon’s complex political landscape. Despite President Aoun’s efforts to assert governmental control over security, practical realities suggest a troubling alignment with Hezbollah, necessitating urgent reforms and international engagement to preserve national stability.
Original Source: www.jewishpress.com
