The Islamic State in Somalia, formed in 2015 from the remnants of al-Shabaab, has been involved in high-profile attacks and extortion activities. Research indicates that while the group’s capabilities have been diminished in recent military campaigns, it remains a threat due to its ongoing financial operations and potential for recruitment from local populations. Its influence, though overstated, poses ongoing security challenges in Puntland.
The Islamic State in Somalia, known as ISIS, has emerged as a significant affiliate of the global jihadist network. Established in 2015 and based in Puntland, the group has been the target of international military operations, including the first combat operation of the Trump administration in February 2025. Their activities include connections to planned attacks on prominent sites such as the Vatican and the Israeli embassy in Stockholm. Researcher Stig Jarle Hansen analyzes the group’s origins, evolution, and recent military setbacks in Puntland’s mountains.
Prior to the formation of the Islamic State in Somalia, al-Shabaab had established itself within the region. Sheikh Abdulqader Muumin, the eventual leader of the Islamic State in Somalia, emerged from a splinter group associated with al-Shabaab. The clan structure of Somali society facilitated the group’s growth, particularly through connections with the Ali Suleiban sub-clan, which engaged in smuggling and piracy—practices integral to Puntland’s economy and history.
Muumin’s background includes living in Sweden and the UK before his return to Somalia, where he became a prominent figure within al-Shabaab. His defection to lead the Islamic State in Somalia in 2015, alongside his second-in-command Mahad Moalim, marked a turning point for the group. Their first video propaganda effort appeared in 2016, with a subsequent bombing in 2017 significantly boosting the group’s finances through extortion from local businesses.
The group was formally recognized as an Islamic State province in 2018, with Muumin and his regional office gaining oversight of operations beyond Somalia. Estimated to have generated $2.3 million by mid-2022, their financial operations have positioned them as significant players in regional jihadism, although their territorial control remains modest compared to al-Shabaab.
The Islamic State’s influence in Somalia is often exaggerated; it has never secured large territories and, by 2024, its numbers were modest at best. Any links to major planned attacks appear tenuous, and claims regarding Muumin’s status within the Islamic State leadership hierarchy are questionable due to his tribal lineage and the group’s limited territorial and operational reach.
In January 2025, a counter-offensive led by Puntland authorities, with support from the US and UAE, resulted in significant victories, including the elimination of numerous Islamic State fighters. By the end of February, the morale of the remaining fighters appeared depleted, particularly following the loss of their primary base in Buur Dexhtaal. However, their operational capability remains intact with hundreds of fighters still active and potential for recruitment from local communities and refugees.
Stig Jarle Hansen has disclosed no affiliations or financial interests that would benefit from this article, which offers insight into the complex dynamics of the Islamic State in Somalia and its ongoing conflicts.
In summary, the Islamic State in Somalia has evolved from the remnants of al-Shabaab, leveraging clan dynamics for operational growth. While recent military successes against the group have decreased its immediate influence, it retains the ability to operate and extort funds in Puntland. The complicated socio-economic landscape combined with ongoing conflict poses a persistent challenge for local and international authorities. Ultimately, while the group’s reputation may be inflated, its potential for resurgence highlights the importance of addressing the underlying conditions that allow such extremist factions to thrive.
Original Source: www.inkl.com
